Problem Concepts in Evolution Part II: Cause and Chance by Louise S. Mead & Eugenie C. Scott
CURRICULUM ARTICLE
Problem Concepts in Evolution Part II: Cause and Chance
Louise S. Mead & Eugenie C. Scott
Published online: 30 April 2010
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract In a previous article, we suggested that differences
in how the general public and scientists use terms such as
purpose and design can lead to confusion, particularly around
understanding evolution and mechanisms of evolutionary
change. Here, we present two additional problem concepts,
cause and chance, and discuss how these concepts lead to
confusion, suggesting how to address these specific chal-
lenges to understanding evolution in light of recent research
in cognitive psychology and biological concept inventories.
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Sinatra et al. (2008) suggest that “helping people to understand
evolution is not a matter of adding on to their existing
knowledge, but helping them to revise their previous models of
the world to create an entirely new way of seeing,” by
specifically challenging default ways of thinking. The Amer-
ican student population is largely religious and a significant
minority rejects evolution (Higher Education Research Institute
2005). In our experience, many students become mired in a
false dichotomy: that acceptance of evolution requires rejection
of a belief in God. We suggested in an earlier article (Mead
and Scott 2010) that the differing scientific and student
interpretations of two concepts commonly used in teaching
evolution, purpose and design, may exacerbate such a position.
Students regularly conflate their own existential meanings of
these terms with scientific definitions.
Just as the terms purpose and design may evoke
supernatural explanations for many students, cause and
chance can create similar problems—cause because it too
can be interpreted to include supernatural explanations;
chance because it can be interpreted to mean “purposeless”
or “random” in the sense of meaninglessness. It is important
for students to understand and use the scientific definitions
in context because cause and chance/random are fundamen-
tal to explanations of mechanisms of evolutionary change.
For example, a Concept Inventory of Natural Selection
(Anderson et al. 2002) asks students to determine “[w]hat
caused populations of birds having different beak shapes and
sizes to become distinct species distributed on the various
islands” and to know that “different beak types first arise in
the Galapagos finches” because “changes in the finches’
beaks occurred by chance”—in the sense of the change
occurring independent of intention or need (emphasis
added). Students need to have a clear understanding of
how these concepts are used in the context of evolution.
Cause: Proximate and Ultimate
“Why” explanations seek to specify the cause of a
phenomenon. For example, modern biologists might be
interested in why some male gorillas disperse from the
groups where they were born or why crossbills exhibit
extensive adaptive radiation or why breeding pairs of ring-
billed gulls adopt unrelated chicks. In most cases, modern
biologists recognize two classes of causes: proximate and
ultimate. Proximate causes in biology are invoked by
explanations that answer questions about an organism over
its lifetime (Ariew 2003)—for example, male gorilla
dispersal may be caused by demographic and behavioral
influences (Stoinski et al. 2009)—and often have to do with
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developmental or mechanistic causes. Ultimate causes in
biology are associated with evolutionary explanations, the
“making and changing of genetic programs” (Mayr 1993)—
for example, the data suggest that divergent selection for
utilizing alternative resources is the ultimate cause of
adaptive radiations in crossbills (Benkman 2003).
Rarely do biologists assume only proximate or only
ultimate causes explain phenomena; rarely do they assume
only one proximate or ultimate cause—instead, research in
evolutionary biology typically seeks to disentangle the
relative effects of these various causes. For example, why is
it often the case that male birds are gaudy and female birds
are drab? Answering the question in terms of proximate
causes, a biologist would discuss the hormonal differences
between males and females related to differences in the
expression of alleles, limited to only one sex or repressed or
promoted in only one sex by regulatory elements (Coyne et al.
2007). Answering the question in terms of ultimate causes, a
biologist would reflect on the evolutionary history of the
difference in plumage (Mayr 1993): given the existence of
these genetically based differences that produce color
variations in males and females, natural and sexual selection,
drift, and migration, operating over many generations, cause
the population to change with respect to these characters.
Like scientists, members of the nonscientific public
recognize more than one level of causation. Although most
people wouldn’t use the terms proximate or ultimate in
discussing, say, an arrhythmia, an abnormality in heart
rhythm, they certainly wouldn’t have any trouble distin-
guishing between the claim that a sudden cardiac arrest was
due (proximately) to a specific malfunction in the heart’s
electrical system and the claim that the cardiac arrest was
due (more ultimately) to a nutrient imbalance, an electrical
shock, the consumption of illegal drugs, or a preexisting
heart condition such as coronary artery disease. Nor would
they have any trouble understanding that more proximate
causes are compatible with more ultimate causes: that it
could be reasonable to say that the cardiac arrest was
caused by a specific malfunction and that it was also caused
by a preexisting heart condition.
But there is a difference in their understanding of
ultimate causes. Because ultimate causes have to be
inferred, claims about them are more uncertain, and because
such claims deal with more general phenomena at a more
abstract and theoretical level, they can be harder to
understand and assess. Since the public thinks that there
are (or may be) ultimate causes of various phenomena, but
is usually uncertain about or ignorant of what scientists
think are (or might be) those causes, or consider natural
causes alone to be insufficient, it is often tempting for the
public to invoke divine causation in cases where natural
ultimate causes are hard to discern and where doing so
might reinforce existing religious or moral views.
For example, the proximate causes of the 2010 Haitian
and Chilean earthquakes were movement of the tectonic
plates upon which each nation sits. Most Americans
understand that continents have moved over time (National
Science Board 2010) and would understand that the
proximate cause for the devastation was natural. Similarly,
natural causes can readily be found to explain the difference
between the greater degree of devastation suffered in Haiti
than in Chile: the proximity of the Haitian quake epicenter
to heavily populated Port-au-Prince as compared to the
more rural epicenter in Chile, poorer building construction
codes in Haiti than in Chile, and so forth. Evangelist Pat
Robertson, however, while not denying the natural causes
of the earthquake, explained that the ultimate cause of the
devastation in Haiti was that its people “swore a pact to the
devil” in the eighteenth century (Anonymous 2010)—
equating the ultimate cause for the earthquake with some
type of supernatural, here diabolical, causation.
Because scientists cannot test supernatural hypotheses,
they do not employ divine or diabolical activity in their
explanations of natural phenomena. Students may need to
have this point explicitly made—ultimate causation in
biology does not employ supernatural explanations but
rather natural, and in particular evolutionary, explanations.
Given the perspectives of most of their students, teachers
and professors should consider explaining the various types
of causation. A key point to stress is that scientific
hypotheses are testable. Proximate causes in biology are
often observable, so students will have no problems
understanding that hypotheses about proximate causes are
testable. Ultimate causes in biology, as elsewhere, are
typically inferred; yet, hypotheses about them are testable,
too. Hypotheses about supernatural causes, however, are
not testable. (Such hypotheses may include empirical
elements that are testable, of course: the hypothesis that
God created the universe about 6,000 years ago, for
example, is testable, has been tested, and turns out to be
false. But the hypothesis failed only with respect to the age
of the universe; the broader hypothesis that God created the
universe is unaffected by the failure of the narrower
hypothesis.) So despite the temptations to think otherwise,
ultimate explanations in science cannot invoke supernatural
causation.
The purpose of this approach is to present science and
evolution honestly, but in a way that does not slam shut the
door of scientific understanding for students who are
believers. When the different types of causation and their
role in scientific thought are clearly stated, evolutionary
explanations, which are testable explanations of natural
phenomena in terms of natural causes, can take their place
as valid scientific explanations—without forcing religious
students (the majority in most classrooms) to choose
between science and religion. Students may choose to
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accept, reject, or remain agnostic about supernatural
explanations as long as they (and their teachers and
professors) understand that in the science classroom the
focus is on testable explanations.
Chance and Randomness
Within biology, a clear understanding of probability
concepts such as chance and randomness is necessary for
understanding evolutionary processes. However, the spe-
cialized meanings of these terms in science conflicts with
the way they are understood outside of the discipline. In
science, to talk about the chance of something happening is
to claim that it will occur according to a known probability.
To know the probability of a phenomenon allows a
prediction of its occurrence. For example, a biologist might
say that the chance (probability) of getting a homozygous
recessive genotype in a heterozygous cross is one in four or
that the types of observed mutations are the same frequency
as expected by chance (Lynch et al. 2008). Confusingly for
students, scientists also apply chance to unpredictable
events to say that the outcome of a particular event is not
predictable. For example, you might say that it is a matter
of chance whether a child will be male or female, even
though you can also say that the chance that it will be a
male is equal to the chance that it will be a female. The
origin of new genetic variations by mutation is another case
in point: it is possible to predict probabilistically that new
variation will arise, but it is not possible to predict whether
a mutation will occur at a particular nucleotide site. Genetic
drift is also often referred to as “changes occurring by
chance,” meaning that the gene or genotype frequency
changes that occur are not due to natural selection, but to
the vagaries of random sampling. So it is not surprising that
students can be confused by “chance” since the term is used
to describe phenomena as known as well as unknown.
In addition to the confusion that may arise within the
classroom, additional sources of misunderstanding about
the term chance come from “the street.” Antievolutionists
regularly contrast evolution as the result of chance
(meaning directionless) processes with design (the result
of the plan or purpose of the Creator). Intelligent design
proponent Phillip Johnson wrote, “The important claim of
evolution is that life developed gradually from nonliving
matter to its present state of diverse complexity through
purposeless natural mechanisms that are known to science”
(Johnson 1991:33, emphasis added). Harking back to
Paley’s argument from design, creationists contend that
complex structures such as the bacterial flagellum could not
have occurred by chance (purposeless or directionless)
processes in the same way that a Boeing 747 could not have
assembled itself from airplane parts by a tornado blowing
through a junkyard. Although creationists discuss the
“improbability” of an amino acid sequence assembling by
“chance,” they use “by chance” primarily to mean “with no
planning or purpose.” The nonscientific public, encouraged
by antievolutionists, contrasts “natural” with “designed,”
not realizing that a natural process such as natural selection
can produce design, in the sense of complex, functioning
structures.
Randomness, because it also deals with probability and
predictability, is another problematic concept for biology
students, many of whom, using a “street” rather than a
mathematical definition, assume that random means
“purposeless.” Descriptions in the media of random
violence, for example, are not claiming that everyone has
an equal probability of being a victim, but that such
violence is meaningless and purposeless. Garvin-Doxas and
Klymkowsky (2008) reported that substantial difficulty in
understanding molecular and evolutionary biology is
associated with deep-seated misconceptions about random
processes, noting that students believe that random pro-
cesses are inefficient, whereas they regard biological
systems as very efficient. Therefore, students mistakenly
reason that randomness is irrelevant to biology—even
though such processes in fact are important in many areas
of the field. A lack of understanding of the role of random
or stochastic processes in biology becomes even more
important when applied to the topic of evolution: students
believe that evolution requires a driving force, for example,
that natural selection could not occur through random
processes because they equate random with purposeless.
Scientists and mathematicians use random to suggest not
purposelessness, but unpredictability, such as the random
walk associated with Brownian motion or the random
sampling of gametes that occurs in every population from
one generation to the next, which in small populations, can
result in substantial genetic drift—changes in allele fre-
quencies that are not predictable given what is known about
selection and allele frequencies. Nature is full of phenom-
ena that are unpredictable (or unpredictable given our
current knowledge); for example, biologists refer to events
such as the Cretaceous–Tertiary asteroid impact as a
“random” cause in this sense. When teachers and professors
use terms like random and chance in so many differing
ways, it is not surprising that students get them confused.
We urge teachers to be explicit about how the terms are
used in a given context to avoid these misunderstandings.
Further complicating the picture, most students do not
understand the role that chance plays in evolution and
natural selection. Evolution refers to the inference of
common ancestry of living things and involves differen-
tial reproduction; some individuals (or genotypes) leave
more or fewer offspring than others. Some differential
reproduction is due to chance (random sampling), and
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some, to the positive or negative value of genetically
determined traits in a particular environment (natural
selection). So while chance factors are involved in
evolution, natural selection is the antithesis of the public
view of chance. Natural selection is adaptive differential
reproduction, and adaptive is the key to understanding this
principle. That natural selection is adaptive means by
definition it is not a chance process. Chance (probability)
is relevant to natural selection only in relation to the
production of the genetic variation on which natural
selection depends. Even so, it must be made clear to
students that this use of chance is the scientists’ probabi-
listic term, not the public’s “purposeless, senseless” use of
chance. Genetic variation produced by mutation and
recombination has probabilistic (chance) elements—the
opposite of what the public thinks of chance.
The Lessons for Your Lessons
So if we are to expect students to understand scientific uses
of terms like cause, chance, and random, we need to be
aware that what students hear is generally not going to be
what the professor or teacher means. Terms of art like these
have specific definitions in the context of science that differ
from the meanings students ascribe to them outside of
science. Often these terms of art are interpreted in a
nonmaterial or religious context, even though these additional
meanings are outside of science. If teachers and professors do
not recognize these extrascientific understandings of common
terms like cause, chance, and random (as well as purpose
and design, discussed in our earlier article [Mead and Scott
2010]), they may inadvertently signal to students that their
religious views are inherently incompatible with science.
Careful and explicit distinguishing of proximate, ultimate,
and divine causation—not just in an introductory “nature of
science” lesson, but regularly throughout the course in
regards to relevant subject matter such as evolution—can
help to avoid this. It is critical that supernatural causes be
clearly identified as being outside of science.
Similarly, because students often give extrascientific
meanings to concepts such as chance and random, tying
them to ideas of meaninglessness or purposelessness, it
should be made clear that such addenda to the scientific
uses of these terms are outside of what scientists can test,
and therefore, not considered in a scientific analysis.
Students may hold ideas of meaning and purpose that
indeed are outside of science and not addressed in a
science class, but such ideas are often very important to
them. It is one thing to set aside such notions as being
outside of the subject area of a science class, and another
to dismiss them as unimportant or nonexistent. Doing the
latter runs the risk of alienating students from science
and impeding their acceptance of evolution and other
scientific explanations.
We encourage teachers and professors who teach
evolution—or any area of science—to think carefully about
how they teach these “problem concepts in evolution”: to
recognize that they are terms of art in science that have
diverse meanings outside of science and to define and use
them carefully and explicitly, distinguishing the scientific
meanings in context without denigrating extrascientific
meanings. It is possible to preserve the integrity of science
as a naturalistic way of knowing about nature—indeed, the
best epistemology for this purpose—while still leaving
open the door for religious students to accommodate a
variety of their views with a scientific understanding of the
natural world. Inadvertently slamming shut that door by not
recognizing the extrascientific meanings students associate
with the “problem concepts” defeats the purpose of
education.
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